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Abstract 
Socio-cognitive action reproduces and changes both social and cognitive structures. The 
analytical distinction between these dimensions of structure provides us with richer models of 
scientific development. In this study, I assume that (i) social structures organize expectations into 
belief structures that can be attributed to individuals and communities; (ii) expectations are 
specified in scholarly literature; and (iii) intellectually the sciences (disciplines, specialties) tend 
to self-organize as systems of rationalized expectations. Whereas social organizations remain 
localized, academic writings can circulate, and expectations can be stabilized and globalized 
using symbolically generalized codes of communication. The intellectual restructuring, however, 
remains latent as a second-order dynamics that can be accessed by participants only reflexively. 
Yet, the emerging “horizons of meaning” provide feedback to the historically developing 
organizations by constraining the possible future states as boundary conditions. I propose to 
model these possible future states using incursive and hyper-incursive equations from the 
computation of anticipatory systems. Simulations of these equations enable us to visualize the 
couplings among the historical—i.e., recursive—progression of social structures along 
trajectories, the evolutionary—i.e., hyper-incursive—development of systems of expectations at 
the regime level, and the incursive instantiations of expectations in actions, organizations, and 
texts. 
Keywords: anticipation, simulation, incursion, hyper-incursion, expectation
                                                 
a
 I acknowledge Staša Milojević and Andrea Scharnhorst for comments on a previous draft. An initial 
version of this paper was presented at the workshop “Simulating the Social Process of Science,” April 7-
11, 2014, at the Lorentz Center in Leiden. 
2 
Introduction 
 
Agent-based modelling (ABM) has become very popular in the social sciences ever since the 
publication of Epstein & Axtell’s book Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the 
Bottom Up (1996). Epstein (2006) formulated his “generativist” research program as a manifesto 
stating that one cannot explain a social phenomenon until one has “grown” it by simulating the 
phenomena under study as emerging from the bottom-up. In science & technology studies, this 
research program accords with the strong program in the sociology of science: individuals and 
their aggregates in institutions are to be considered as the units of analysis that generate the 
dynamics of science (Edmonds et al., 2011). From this perspective, the sciences are considered 
as community-based belief systems, and the units of analysis are agents or collectives driven by a 
blend of socio-epistemic interests.  
 
Although the agents—scientists—are able to perceive and understand the intellectual dimensions 
of their sciences, the intellectual organization of the sciences at the supra-individual level is not 
conceptualized in ABM as the substantive result of discursive interactions. The intellectual 
organization of the sciences is considered as part of their social organization, and content is 
defined in terms of the individual cognition of the interacting agents (Payette, 2012; Sun et al., 
2013). From this perspective, references and citations can be understood as rhetorical devices in 
scientific practices (e.g., Cozzens, 1989; Gilbert, 1977; Gilbert & Woolgar, 1974). 
 
ABM has the advantage of being defined in terms of observable behavior; but an “agent-based 
ontology” (McGlade, 2013, at p. 395) entails problems when simulating mental processes. How 
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can one observe cognition, let alone the group dynamics of negotiations among individual 
cognitive states (Ahrweiler, 2011)? Krohn et al. (1992), for example, simulated knowledge 
production in research groups as the outcomes of negotiations using the model of laboratory 
studies (Knorr & Mulkay, 1983).  
 
However, the outcomes of these discussions at the group level eventually have to be written up 
in manuscripts or working papers containing knowledge claims (Latour & Woolgar, 1979). The 
drafts have to circulate in other exchange processes at the field level before being sufficiently 
codified for acceptance as part of the scientific literature (Myers, 1985; Pinch, 1985). These 
condensates of individual and communicatively shared cognitive resources and processes 
furthermore contain traces of social organization, and structure the literature in terms of latent 
factors that can be recognized as fields or disciplines (e.g., Van den Besselaar, 2001). However, 
the designation of the densities (or other patterns) in the networks that emerge in agent-based 
simulations always requires a theoretical inference. The interpretation of the patterns is not given 
naturalistically. 
 
Although focusing equally on the social dynamics of science, Sun et al. (2013, p. 4) note that 
“(f)uture ‘science of science’ studies have to gauge the role of scientific discoveries, 
technological advances, and other exogenous events in the emergence of new disciplines against 
the purely social baseline” that resulted from their simulations. However, the authors claim that 
their account of the emergence of disciplines is the first that can be validated on the basis of 
empirical data. In a similar vein, Edmonds et al. (2011) state that “science is substantially a 
social phenomenon;” and “agent-based simulations of social processes are able to incorporate 
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lessons from qualitative social science studies of what scientists actually do on a day-to-day level 
as well as insights from the more naturalistic philosophers of science.” Research programs about 
“the simulation of the social processes of science” have increasingly been organized in terms of 
workshops,
1
 special issues,
2
 and edited volumes (e.g., Scharnhorst et al., 2012). 
 
In this study, I propose alternatively to consider the sciences not primarily in terms of the belief 
systems of actors, but as systems of rationalized expectations to which agents and organizations 
have reflexive access and can thus contribute to their restructuring (Husserl, 1929 and 1935; 
Luhmann, 1990). Localized manifestations can be considered as instantiations in which puzzles 
can be solved and new knowledge claims constructed (Giddens 1979). The theory and 
computation of anticipatory systems enable us to model expectations and then proceed to their 
simulation (Dubois, 1998; Rosen, 1985). 
 
First, I assume communication as the unit of analysis of the intellectual and social organization 
of the sciences (Gilbert, 1997). Communications can be attributed to agents as first-order 
variables; but the results of the interactions among communications (e.g., densities and 
components) are second-order variables—variables attributed to the first-order variables—that 
may remain latent for the agents involved, yet structure nonetheless their further communication. 
In the sciences, the interactions among communications shape discourses that tend to be highly 
codified, for example, as jargons. Codification is functional for the determination of quality in 
the context of justification (leading to revision and rewriting) whereas the agents provide the 
discourses with knowledge claims from below (for example, in observational reports and 
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 For example, at http://www.lorentzcenter.nl/lc/web/2014/607/info.php3?wsid=607&venue=Oort 
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manuscripts). The structure of communications in science can thus be expected to contain 
interactions among rationalized expectations, which can only be accessed reflexively by 
individuals or discussed in organizations.  
 
At the local level, the complexity of this next-order communication framework can 
programmatically be reduced to the belief systems of individuals and organizations. This 
sociological reduction of rationalized expectations to belief systems of communities and agents 
has been a radical tenet of the so-called Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) or “the strong 
program” in science studies (e.g., Barnes, 1977; Barnes & Edge, 1982; Bloor, 1976). However, 
this perspective over-sociologizes the study of the sciences: it no longer matters whether or not a 
statement is “true”; but one seeks instead to explain why agents believe that a statement is true in 
terms of socio-cognitive interests. The codes of the communication are thus no longer attributed 
in terms of their functionality in the communications, but are operationalized sociologically in 
terms of interests, for example, of authors, journals, publishers, or other stakeholders. The 
discourse can then be considered as a rhetorical game driven by career perspectives and 
institutional interests (Cozzens, 1989; Edge, 1979; Gilbert, 1977). 
 
In my opinion, this focus on belief systems and behavior fails to address the specificity of the 
modern sciences as cognitive structures of expectations (e.g., paradigms) that are constructed and 
reconstructed in discursive exchanges in addition to and on top of contingent interests in the 
context of discovery. The differentiation between rationalized expectations and belief systems 
was central to the Scientific Revolution of the 17
th
 century (Merton, 1942). Unlike belief 
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systems, which tend to be integrated hierarchically, the sciences are also expected to develop 
discursively in terms of theoretical and empirical arguments.  
 
The discursive mediation provides a third context to the distinction between the local context of 
discovery and the global context of justification as formulated in the philosophy of science. 
Although this latter distinction was reformulated in the sociology of science as the group/field 
distinction (Rip, 1981; Whitley, 1984), these “dialectical” co-evolution models fail to appreciate 
a third dynamics of discourse and texts as a context of mediation. This third context of the 
dynamics in the scientific literature has nonetheless been central to the scientometric enterprise 
(Price, 1976; Wyatt et al., in preparation). Unlike a co-evolution between two contexts, a “triple 
helix” can endogenously generate crises and other forms of complex dynamics (Krippendorff, 
2009; Ivanova & Leydesdorff, 2014; Ulanowicz, 2009). 
 
In response to the strong program, Mulkay et al. (1983) first raised the question of “why an 
analysis of scientific discourse is needed,” and Gilbert & Mulkay (1984) then added—on the 
basis of a laboratory study of oxidative phosphorylation which led, among other things, to Peter 
Mitchell’s Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1978—that different repertoires co-exist in the sciences. 
Scholars attribute error to a contingent repertoire and acceptance of knowledge claims to an 
empirical one, and thus distinguish between truth and error in terms of translations. In the 
ensuing “sociology of translation,” Callon et al. (1983 and 1986) suggested considering the 
sciences as a semiosis—that is, a system of signs in texts (Callon & Latour, 1981; Latour, 1988; 
Wouters, 1998). Authors, for example, are represented in the text as author names or references, 
7 
institutional addresses are provided in a byline to the title, and the texts contain words and cited 
references that indicate the intellectual organization of the arguments.  
 
In a study entitled “In Search of Epistemic Networks,” Leydesdorff (1991) argued that three 
dimensions can be distinguished analytically: authors and their aggregates in communities and 
institutions, texts which can be aggregated in bodies of literature such as journals and 
repositories, and cognitions that are organized in theoretical frameworks leading to new ideas, 
hypotheses, and heuristics. The reduction of cognitive structures to texts or social agency 
objectifies the sciences and makes them amenable to measurement using geometrical metaphors. 
However, one should avoid the “reification trap” of an “agent-based ontology” (McGlade, 2013, 
pp. 294f.) by distinguishing between the operationalization and what is operationalized. 
Simulations enable us additionally to address the cognitive structures of expectations 
algorithmically. As Leibniz (1692) put it: “What I love best about the calculus is that (…) it frees 
us from working with our imagination” (Yoder, 1988, p. 175). The psychological imagination 
plays with geometrical topologies, but the sciences develop at the supra-individual level and with 
time as one more degree of freedom. 
 
Structures of rationalized expectations as anticipatory systems 
 
Unlike texts and agents or their institutions, cognitions are not given, but remain constructed. 
These constructs are both organized—for example, in our minds or in their local settings—as 
instantiations (Giddens, 1979) and self-organizing as “horizons of meaning” (Husserl, 1929). 
Luhmann (e.g., 1990) added that “truth” can then be considered as a symbolically generalized 
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medium of communication (Parsons, 1968) that enables us to shortcut the communication by 
using another channel. The symbolic coding of the communication enables us to handle more 
complexity because the language usage can be restricted (Bernstein, 1971; Coser, 1975).  
 
Within paradigmatic frameworks, for example, one does not need to explicate core assumptions 
all the time, and thus more complexity can be handled per unit of time. The paradigm or horizon 
of meaning is globalized, whereas day-to-day activities are localized and thus organized 
contingently (Fujigaki, 1998). The counter-intuitive point is the possible inversion of the arrow 
of time, which has deep consequences for the ontology of the cognitive dimension and structures 
of expectation: coding provides uncertainty with meaning; but meaning is provided to the events 
from a perspective of hindsight—that is, at a moment t + 1 given an event at time t. Thus, one 
looks backward, while the stream of events moves forward.
3
  
 
In their “sociology of expectations,” Brown & Michael (2003) formulate this tension as between 
“retrospecting prospects and prospecting retrospects.” In a similar vein, Latour (1987, at p. 97) 
observed that “the two versions (…) are not uttered by the same face of Janus.” In terms of social 
constructivism, one can also distinguish between the constructing agency and the resulting 
constructs of prospects, insights, and meanings (Borup et al., 2006). The constructs are 
constructed in terms of codified meanings, and thus have a status different from observable 
agency or semiosis among texts. 
 
                                                 
3
 One is reminded of Walter Benjamin’s ([1940] 1974) “Angel of History.” 
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Meaning is not objective, but subjective and potentially inter-subjective. Codification operates 
on meaning by reinforcing its backward restructuring of historical events using a dynamics of 
cultural evolution that touches the historical ground by being instantiated in action. These 
instantiations can be considered as both retention and historical reproduction mechanisms. The 
constructs can be shared—taught and learned—using discourse. Husserl (1929) suggested that 
the intersubjectivity in the constructs is “transcendental” to the contingent events and thus drives 
the development of the sciences (Husserl, 1938). At the time, Husserl noted the absence of 
instruments for the specification of these (co-)evolutionary mechanisms:  
 
We must forgo a more precise investigation of the layer of meaning which provides the 
human world and culture, as such, with a specific meaning and therewith provides this 
world with specifically “mental” predicates. (Husserl, 1929, at p. 138; my translation). 
 
Cognitive structures are not objective, but they can be expected to drive the observable 
instantiations as a virtual order of uncertainties (Giddens, 1979, p. 64; Luhmann, 1990a). What 
can be considered as feedback and what as feeding forward in these co-evolutions may also 
change over time. When the system is under (re)construction, agency can be expected to drive 
the exploration; but the construct can be expected to develop further in terms of its structures, 
and structures can also be stabilized over time. Whereas structure operates by selecting 
deterministically from variation (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2011), the structures of expectation 
contain uncertainty and can thus serve at other moments as sources of variation. 
 
Note that in terms of information theory, a feedback against the arrow of time would generate 
negative entropy or, in other words, redundancy. However, Shannon (1948) deliberately coupled 
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information theory as probabilistic entropy with thermodynamic entropy—also in order to focus 
on the electrical-engineering problem and not on the meaning of the communication (p. 3). From 
this (Shannon) perspective, negative entropy is not possible (Krippendorff, 2009).  Following 
Husserl, however, a Cartesian dualism is introduced between the worlds of uncertainties 
(information) and meaning: reflexivity (res cogitans) operates against the arrow of time, whereas 
res extensa necessarily generates entropy. Meanings can be shared and thus add to the 
redundancy. The imprint of the res cogitans on the res extensa can sometimes be measured 
(Leydesdorff & Ivanova, 2014). But let us remain in this study with the inversion of time as an 
algorithmic problem. 
 
Incursion and hyper-incursion in anticipatory systems 
 
Rosen (1985) defined an anticipatory system as a system that entertains a model of itself. The 
model provides the system with access to other possible states. Dubois (1998; cf. Dubois & 
Resconi, 1992) proposed to model the anticipated states using incursive and hyper-incursive 
equations. In these difference equations, future or present states can be considered counter-
intuitively as independent variables driving systems of expectations (Leydesdorff & Franse, 
2009).  
 
One can reformulate recursive equations into (hyper-)incursive ones by changing the temporal 
parameters: instead of xt as a function of xt-1, one writes xt as a function of xt+1. Dubois’ prime 
example is the logistic equation that can be used, among other things, for modelling biological 
phenomena. This so-called Pearl-Verhulst equation is formulated as follows:  
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 )1( 11   ttt xaxx  (1) 
 
An incursive version of this equation, mutatis mutandis, reads as follows:
4
 
 
 )1(1 ttt xaxx    (2) 
 
and the corresponding hyper-incursive model is formulated by Dubois (1998) as: 
 
 )1( 11   ttt xaxx  (3) 
 
Whereas the logistic equation models a growth process with a feedback in the case of biology, 
the incursive equation models an instantiation at the present moment as a process that is hyper-
incursively embedded in the structure of expectations provided by Eq. 3. 
 
In the case of Eq. 2, for example, the anticipatory system x builds on its previous state (xt -1), but 
it selects among its current options and thus realizes one instantiation among other possible 
states. From this perspective, the use of the recursive formulation of the equation (Eq. 1) for 
modeling social phenomena can be questioned as a biological metaphor. The market as a social 
system of expectations, for example, does not select commodities, technologies, etc., from 
among options provided at a previous moment (that is, 1 – xt-1), but selects from options in the 
present while restructuring itself as an instantiation on the basis of previous states. 
                                                 
4
 Another incursive equation is . This quadratic equation has two roots [ and x = 0], which correspond to the steady 
states of Eq. 2 to be discussed below (Leydesdorff & Franse, 2009, at pp. 110f.). 
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In Eq. 3, history (xt-1) no longer plays a role, but the system is overwritten at xt in terms of future 
states. Note that future states are only available as expectations, and only a model of the system 
enables us to use expectations for the restructuring of the system. Thus, these equations address 
core notions of how the sciences operate at the epistemic level. How can predictions entertained 
in models drive the sciences? 
 
Dubois (2002, pp. 112 ff.) makes a further relevant distinction between weakly and strongly 
anticipatory systems. A weakly anticipatory system entertains a model to predict future states of 
a system under study; a strongly anticipatory system uses future states for restructuring itself in a 
process of self-organization. Whereas individuals can entertain a model of the system reflexively 
as weakly anticipatory systems, the systems of rationalized expectations—the horizons of 
meaning—are themselves restructured in terms of refinements of the expectations and can thus 
be considered as strongly anticipatory and as operating at an intersubjective level.  
 
Solving the equations 
 
The incursive and hyper-incursive equations have other solutions than the recursive ones. Let us 
first solve the incursive Eq. 2:  
 
 )1( 11   ttt xaxx  (2) 
 11   tttt xaxaxx  (2a) 
 ttt axaxx  )1(1  (2b) 
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 )1/(1 ttt axaxx   (2c) 
 
By replacing xt+1 with xt in Eq. 2c, two steady states can be found for x = 0 and x = (1 – a)/a, 
respectively. These steady states correspond to the non-existence of the system (x = 0) and a line 
in the bifurcation diagram of x against the parameter a. In Figure 1, this line of the steady state is 
penciled on top of the well-known bifurcation diagram of the recursive formulation of the 
logistic equation (e.g., May, 1976). As is well-known, the bifurcation diagram of the recursive 
(Pearl-Verhulst) equation is increasingly chaotic when a → 4, and cannot exist for a ≥ 4. 
However, the incursive system can be instantiated both in the domain of a < 4, and in the non-
biological (e.g., psychological) domain of a ≥ 4. 
 
Figure 1: The steady state of the weakly anticipatory system. (Source: Leydesdorff & Franse, 
2009, p. 111). 
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The line penciled into Figure 1 can perhaps be considered as an emerging axis stabilizing an 
identity among the reflections at each moment of time (Leydesdorff & Franse, 2009). The 
weakly anticipatory system provides meaning to the events by integrating them in both the 
biological domain (a < 4; e.g., bodily perceptions) and the social domain of meaning-sharing and 
processing (a ≥ 4). The instantiation of the different representations integrates them historically 
and thus functions as a historical linchpin (cogito) for developing a strongly anticipatory system 
in the cultural (i.e., non-natural) domain of meaning-processing (a ≥ 4). However, the latter 
domain can be considered as a cogitatum, that is, part of a reality about which one can be 
expected to remain in doubt (Luhmann, 1990a). 
 
Equation 3 is a quadratic equation with two solutions: 
 
 )1( 11   ttt xaxx  (3) 
 2
11   ttt axaxx  (3a) 
 01
2
1   ttt xaxax  (3b) 
 0/1
2
1   axxx ttt  (3c) 
 xt+1 = ½  ± ½ √[1 – (4/a) xt] (3d) 
 
This system has no real roots for a < 4, but it has two solutions for values of a > 4. (For a = 4, x 
= ½.) These solutions are added to Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: The system of expectations as a result of hyper-incursion (Leydesdorff & Franse, 
2009, at p. 113). 
 
For a ≥ 4, two expectations are generated at each time step depending on the plus or the minus 
sign in the equation. After N time steps, 2
N
 future states could be possible if this system would 
operate without historical constraints. Thus, the system of expectations continuously needs a 
mechanism for making decisions between options because otherwise this system would rapidly 
become overburdened with uncertainty. In other words, the communication cannot further be 
developed without a form of agency making choices between options because of the continuous 
proliferation of uncertainty by the hyper-incursive mechanism.  
 
Decisions by agency can anchor the anticipatory system historically in instantiations. Luhmann 
(2000) suggested considering decisions as the structuring mechanism of organizations. Although 
this reflexive capacity is conceptualized by Luhmann as endogenous to the communication 
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system, organizations can also be attributed to social structure as institutional agency. From this 
perspective, a psychological system can perhaps be considered as the minimal unit of reflection 
for making choices (Habermas, 1981; Leydesdorff, 2000). Both agency and organizations are 
able to integrate perspectives by reflexively making choices. 
 
If decisions are socially further organized—for example, by using decision rules—an 
institutional layer can increasingly be shaped. The institutional layer provides a retention 
mechanism for the next round of expectations (Aoki, 2001). Thus, the system can be considered 
as dually layered, as (i) a forward-moving retention mechanism and (ii) sets of possible 
expectations which flow through the networks. Note that the possible expectations can be 
expected to proliferate much faster than the retention. Unlike the instantiations, these “horizons 
of meaning” are not given, but continuously in flux and undergoing constant reconstruction 
(Luhmann, 2002). While the agents and the texts are both part of the recursive retention 
mechanism (res extensa), the agents can additionally be expected to act incursively (as the 
cogitantes in res cogitans).
5
 
 
Simulations 
 
The equations remain very abstract because the referents of x are not yet specified. The 
advantage of this abstractness is that this referent can also be cognitive as against textual (e.g., 
co-words) or social (e.g., co-authors). For example, the latent dimensions of networks or the 
development of eigenvector centrality can also be modeled (Leydesdorff, 2010). But how can 
                                                 
5
 In the semiotic tradition—actor-network theory and the sociology of translation—a distinction is made between 
agents in sociology and “actants” in the narrative (e.g., Latour, 1996). 
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one move from these abstract bifurcation diagrams to modeling the epistemic dimension of the 
sciences operating as strongly anticipatory systems?  
 
Using simulations, Leydesdorff (2005) showed in a first step that an incursive routine can 
generate an observer endogenously. Challenged by a competition for visualizations organized by 
Katy Börner at the time (2007; http://vw.indiana.edu/07netsci/), a colleague suggested exploiting 
the graphical interfaces of Windows to input a recognizable picture into the simulations of 
incursive and hyper-incursive routines so that one would be able to recognize observationally 
what these routines do to the representations. Let us postpone the discussion of whether and how 
knowledge can be represented as a dynamic, and focus first on what these routines can do when 
using a stabilized representation. 
 
In a computer language—I will use Visual Basic 6 below—one can consider a picture or any 
representation as an ordered set of pixels that can each be transformed in terms of their 
respective colors using the computer code provided in Table 1 as an example for the recursive 
case (to be discussed below). Mutatis mutandis, the simulation can be extended for incursive and 
hyper-incursive equations, and in a next step one would even be able to specify interaction terms 
between pixels in several routines disturbing one another. But before we complicate the issue 
further, let us explore an example.  
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Figure 3: Van Gogh’s “Langlois Bridge at Arles” to be used as input to the routines.6 
 
Figure 3 shows Van Gogh’s well-known “Langlois Bridge at Arles” that I will use as an 
exemplary representation in the routines. The height of this reproduction is 308 pixels (3322 
twips) and the width is 400 pixels (4200 twips). Visual Basic uses twips because this measure is 
screen-independent. In the simulation of the bridge at Arles, I will use an array of 3322 * 4200 
twips, or approximately 14 * 10
6
 data points.  
 
Using the recursive formulation of the logistic equation (Eq. 1), for example, one can expect a 
transformation of this representation for 1 < a < 3, an oscillation for 3 ≤ a < 3.57, and further 
bifurcation and development towards chaos for larger values of a between 3.57 and 4. As argued 
above, this will be very different for the incursive and hyper-incursive formulations of this same 
model. 
 
                                                 
6
 This image is in the public domain; see at http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vincent_Van_Gogh_0014.jpg . 
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Table 1: Transformation of a representation using the logistic equation (Eq. 1). 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
DO 
    For Y = 0 To PicFrom(0).ScaleHeight 
        For X = 0 To PicFrom(0).ScaleWidth 
            ' Get the source pixel's color components. 
            clr = PicFrom(0).Point(X, Y) 
            r = clr And &HFF 
            g = (clr \ &H100) And &HFF 
            b = (clr \ &H10000) And &HFF 
             
            'scale between zero and one 
            rt = r / 256 
            gt = g / 256 
            bt = b / 256 
 
            'transform incursion 
             
            rt = (param * rt) * (1 - rt) 
            gt = (param * gt) * (1 - gt) 
            bt = (param * bt) * (1 - bt) 
            r = Int(rt * 256) 
            g = Int(gt * 256) 
            b = Int(bt * 256) 
             
            If r > &HFF Then r = &HFF 
            If g > &HFF Then g = &HFF 
            If b > &HFF Then b = &HFF 
             
            ' Write the new pixel. 
            clr = RGB(r, g, b) 
            PicTo(0).PSet (X, Y), clr 
        Next X 
        DoEvents 
    Next Y 
    ' Make the changes permanent. 
    ' PicTo(0).Picture = PicTo(0).Image 
    PicFrom(0).Picture = PicTo(0).Image 
    cmdGo.Enabled = False 
    MousePointer = vbDefault 
     
    DoEvents 
    If param2 = 0 Then Exit Do 
 
Loop While True 
 
Table 1 provides the code for the core transformation of the colors in the recursive case. Two 
pictures are first distinguished: PicFrom(0) with horizontal (x) and vertical (y) values in lines 2 
and 3, and PicTo(0) in lines 35 and 36 for the resulting picture. One can recognize the logistic 
equation in lines 17-19 for the red, green, and blue components of the twips at each specific 
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position. I use the traditional RGB (red-green-blue) decomposition for the colors. Since the 
logistic equation (Eq. 1) requires values for x between zero and one, the color values are first 
divided by 256 in lines 11-13, and then renormalized for the picturing in lines 20-22. 
 
The bifurcation parameter a is provided interactively by the user, and is called “param” in lines 
17-19. The DoEvents in lines 40-41 makes the program sensitive to switching to another routine 
or quitting. The program then runs in two loops for the horizontal x (line 31) and the vertical y 
(line 33), respectively. Each time it runs, the original picture (PicFrom) is replaced by the newly 
generated one. For example, the representation can be expected to erode in a number of steps 
towards chaos for values of a > 3.57 when using the logistic equation recursively (Eq. 1). Figure 
4, which can be run interactively using the program available at 
http://www.leydesdorff.net/simulation.2015/netsci.exe , combines the recursive, incursive, and 
hyper-incursive routines in a single setting. 
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Figure 4: Recursion, incursion, and hyper-incursion in cases of using the logistic equation with Van Gogh’s “Langlois Bridge at Arles;” 
http://www.leydesdorff.net/simulation.2015/netsci.exe 
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Figure 4 shows the different states of the system after a number of runs with the bifurcation 
parameter a = 3.6, as specified by the user in the box at the top right. Since a > 3.57, the 
representation is decaying using the logistic equation in the left-top (PicFrom) and middle-top 
(PicTo) representations that alternate (since after each loop PicTo becomes defined as PicFrom).  
 
I added two reflexive observers using the incursive routine. They are first able to hold their 
representation by building on the previous state, but secondly by observing in the present. The 
first observer is generated in the left-bottom screen observing directly the original picture 
(PicFrom) in the left-top screen. (For a more extensive discussion of the generation of an 
observer and observers observing each other see also Leydesdorff (2005) and Von Foerster 
(1982).) The observer generated in the right-bottom screen, however, does not observe the 
original picture, but only its transformation using the hyper-incursive equation as depicted in the 
screen box in the middle at the bottom. Note that the representation in this latter box seems 
almost to have disappeared, but the observer is able to regenerate it. We thus show the possibility 
of transmission of the observation at a distance. My argument is that this is not a social process, 
but a communication process. The state of mind of the observers and their social contexts are not 
relevant to the reception, which is determined by the communication of representations. 
 
Discussion and further perspectives 
 
These simulations are far from perfect; they can be considered as conceptual (“toy”) simulations 
that enable us to explore further options (McGlade, 2004, p. 118). However, the reproduction of 
the Van Gogh’s bridge at Arles provides a primitive representation when compared with the 
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complexity conveyed in knowledge representations. I could have used a more complex 
representation such as a chemical structure, but even then, the knowledge is not in the picture, 
but in the argument. A static representation is by definition an instantiation (McGlade, 2003). 
However, one can read the argument in a scientific text sometimes in terms of a sequence of 
figures and tables, and visualizations and animations can be used to summarize an argument. 
How to represent the knowledge itself has hitherto remained a largely unsolved problem. Perhaps 
one could also work with (e.g., Bayesian) probability distributions in terms of grey-shades, but 
the representation would then probably remain more abstract (Leydesdorff, 1992). 
 
My argument has been one against the reification of the cognitive process, but not against 
operationalization. By distinguishing what is operationalized from what is operationalizing, one 
gains reflexivity about the representation. Different reference worlds can be indicated by using 
different equations. Whereas the recursive equation models the development of a system (e.g., a 
biological population) in res extensa, the observer at the left-bottom of Figure 4 can be 
considered as an individual observer using an incursive routine. The hyper-incursive routine, 
however, indicates an evolution that is no longer rooted historically, but can only be entertained 
reflexively by the second observer since it refers to an intersubjective communication domain of 
expectations. As Luhmann (1984, at p. 226; 1995, 164) formulated: “The most important 
consequence of this analysis is that communication cannot be directly observed, only inferred. 
To be observed or to observe itself, a communication system must be flagged as an action 
system.” Luhmann added a reference to Warriner (1970, p. 106), who formulated: “The basic 
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problem in the theory of communication lies in the general reluctance of the social scientist to 
deal with what is not directly observable.”8 
 
The knowledge dimension can sometimes be measured as redundancy or, in other words, the 
relative absence of uncertainty after specification of the negative selection mechanisms that can 
be expected to operate on the observable variation. Leydesdorff & Bensman (2006), for example, 
showed that the intellectual organization of citation patterns among journals is not to be retrieved 
in the power-law distribution of the majority of the citation relations, but in the well-known 
“hook” of this curve representing the most frequent relations—that is, in the area where the 
Poisson process is interrupted for intellectual reasons (Milojević, 2010). Negative entropy or 
redundancy is not observed directly, but can be measured as a negative imprint (Leydesdorff & 
Ivanova, 2014). Retrieving this imprint requires theoretical specification, which generates the 
cognitive domains of expectations that are here under study. 
 
The simulations in this study are technically a first step and mainly meant to demonstrate a 
possible direction for further research. In the above simulations, for example, one could only 
change a single bifurcation parameter interactively. The recursive, incursive, and hyper-incursive 
routines were run with the same bifurcation parameter, while I argued also that only the incursive 
equation has a solution for all values of a. When one feeds the current routine, for example, with 
a = 6, the recursive representation immediately becomes chaotic; but if one first uses the “Go” at 
the hyper-incursive routine in the middle at the bottom, one obtains an oscillation. It would be 
                                                 
8
 In his later work, Luhmann (e.g., 1999) formulated a theory of observation different from Maturana (e.g., 1977) 
and following Spencer Brown (1964) and Von Foerster (1993); cf. Leydesdorff, 2006.  
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worthwhile to explore the further option of using different bifurcation parameters for the various 
routines. 
 
Another further extension would be to add the possibility that the observers interact in a network. 
Using models for adoption, one could, for example, add the possibility that observers accept a 
majority vision given an environment as in the case of a “lock-in” (Arthur, 1989; Leydesdorff, 
2001). For example, one could add to the above simulations a cellular automaton generating 
variation and structures at the same time. How do the two layers of intellectual and social 
organization relate, and under what conditions can control shift from local action to global 
communication, and vice versa? As we know, networks are constructed bottom-up; but since the 
coding in the networks develops as eigenvectors (Von Foerster, 1993), these latent dimensions 
can be expected to feedback and structure the room for contributions. Because the latent cogitata 
remain uncertain and not given, the structuring cannot become deterministic, but remains 
“structuration”: one is not controlled, but “constrained and enabled” by the emerging codes of 
communication (Giddens, 1979). 
 
In other words: while the intellectual, textual, and social organization of the sciences can be 
expected to co-evolve, these co-evolutions are far from symmetrical. The codes are attributes of 
the communications, which are in turn attributes of the communicators. Thus, the intellectual 
networks can develop in terms of a second-order dynamics. Intellectual expansion can therefore 
develop much faster than the social conditions (Weinstein & Platt, 1973). As Slezak (1989) 
noted in a debate with proponents of the strong program, one should not even try to explain the 
larger variance of cognitions in terms of the smaller variance in social organizations.  
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The sociological design can also be inverted: scholars often do not generate much content in 
communication, but intellectual content is the reason for communication. The new content enters 
the discourse as a proposal for a rewrite (Fujigaki, 1998). The structure is selective, and thus the 
social processes tend to follow the intellectual ones. As I argued in the introduction, this 
presumes the symbolic generalization of codes of communication and their differentiation into a 
modern and pluralist society (Luhmann, 1990b and 2002a; Merton, 1942). In older types of 
society (so-called “high cultures”), functional differentiation among the codes of communication 
tends to be suppressed and hierarchical belief systems tend to prevail. Self-organization is based 
on an additional degree of freedom for restructuring the historical organization of meaning 
reflexively. 
 
The use of incursions and hyper-incursions in scientific communication inverts the axis of time 
and thus the entropy flow can be negative. Leydesdorff & Ivanova (2014) have elaborated on the 
mutual redundancy in three or more dimensions generated by the possibility to share meanings in 
the communication of information. The same information can be provided with different 
meanings; in other words, the sharing generates redundancy. Using codes of communication, one 
can additionally translate by relating different meanings and thus generate a third level in the 
communication: first communication is relational; second, systems of communication position 
the information and thus enable us to provide meaning to information; and thirdly, meanings can 
be translated (Callon, 1986). One thus obtains a much richer picture of scientific communication 
that includes the possibility to explore the operation and interaction of codes of communication 
in relatively shielded niches (Petersen et al., in preparation). 
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In terms of the philosophy of science, I have followed Luhmann’s (1986) intuition that Husserl’s 
transcendental concept of “intersubjectivity” can be operationalized in terms of communication 
(Knudsen, 2006; Paul, 2001; cf. Schütz, 1952). Although Luhmann (e.g., 1990, p. 113, n. 59) 
indicated that codes of communication can be considered as functionally differentiated using the 
metaphor of eigenvectors which stand orthogonal,
9
 the notion of anticipation and expectation 
could not be operationalized further at that time (Leydesdorff, 2012, p. 88).
10
 However, the 
theory and computation of anticipatory systems provide us with the tools to take this next step 
toward the simulation of the sciences as structures of expectations. 
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